Sending children to prison for life

Opinion

Our laws make allowances for juveniles’ immaturity; judges should too.

By Bernard E. Harcourt

October 5, 2009

This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will hold oral arguments in two cases, Sullivan vs. Florida and Graham vs. Florida, that will decide whether it’s cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a 13-year-old or a 17-year-old to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The court should follow its prior reasoning in Roper vs. Simmons, a 2005 ruling that held the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional, and similarly draw a bright line at 18 years of age for imposing life sentences without parole.

The extreme rarity with which sentences of life in prison without parole are imposed on juveniles — particularly younger juveniles — shows that this punishment is out of step with American values and society. In the United States, only Joe Sullivan in Florida is serving a life-without-parole sentence for a non-homicide offense, committed at 13. That qualifies as “unusual” under any definition of the word.

The other case on this issue to be heard this term, also from Florida, involves a conviction for armed burglary, again not a homicide. Yet Terrance Graham, who was 17 at the time, was given the maximum sentence that a juvenile convicted for murder would receive.

To be sure, we might not always seek legal guidance abroad. But in this case, the international comparisons are telling. No country other than the United States incarcerates children for life without parole. We were the lone “no” vote against the 2006 U.N. General Assembly resolution calling on all nations to abolish such life sentences. Somalia is the only other nation that has not ratified Article 37 of the U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child, prohibiting juvenile life-without-parole sentences.

The tough-on-crime rhetoric of “lock ’em up and throw away the key” is entirely inappropriate in the case of children. Children’s brains, bodies and personalities are still in the process of growing and changing. And many experts in neuroscience and psychology believe that the same changeability that makes young people vulnerable to negative influences and peer pressure also makes them good candidates for reform and rehabilitation.

In all other areas, we recognize their vulnerabilities. Because of the relative immaturity and irresponsibility of minors, every state in the nation restricts them from voting, serving on juries, purchasing alcohol or marrying without parental consent. States further restrict young adolescents from activities that require more mature judgment, such as driving and consenting to sexual activity. In fact, the state of Florida, where Sullivan and Graham are incarcerated for life, does not even permit adolescents to get their ears pierced without parental consent.

So why should minors be treated like adults when it comes to sentencing?

Ironically, the same laws that are intended to protect children from exploitation and their own immature judgment — including restrictions on driving, working and leaving school grounds — prevent young teens from escaping an abusive parent, a violent household or a crime-ridden neighborhood. As the Supreme Court observed in the 2005 Roper decision, “juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.”

Juvenile offenders should be given the opportunity to have their sentences reviewed later in life. Parole authorities are equipped to determine whether adolescents have served a significant portion of their sentences, have been rehabilitated and pose no threat to others, and to decide whether they deserve the chance to complete their sentences in the community. As is true with adult offenders, juvenile offenders do not have a right to parole release; they should, however, have the right to be considered for that opportunity.

Under the best of circumstances, criminal sentencing is susceptible to mistakes. The better option is to sentence serious juvenile offenders to life sentences with the possibility of parole, and provide the hope that will encourage them to continue their education and take advantage of programs in prison to rehabilitate and reform themselves. It is cruel and unusual to pass a final judgment on a person whose character and identity are still forming.

Bernard E. Harcourt, a professor of law and of political science at the University of Chicago, is the author of “Language of the Gun: Youth, Crime, and Public Policy.”

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

Teen serving LWOP sentence in Colorado may get new trial

Colorado judge weighs Ybanez case in his mother’s death

New lawyers fault defense of man convicted as teen in mom’s ’98 death

Posted: 10/05/2009 01:00:00 AM MDT

Nathan Ybanez, shown in 2005, was convicted in the beating death of his mother, Julie. His new attorneys believe his lawyer at the trial had a conflict of interest after being hired by the teen’s father. (Denver Post file photo )

Eleven years after Nathan Ybanez was caught unloading his mother’s body from the trunk of her car, a judge is considering whether to grant him a new trial or reduce his prison sentence of life without parole.

Ybanez and his friend, Erik Jensen, got into a fight with Julie Ybanez in June 1998. She was beaten and strangled with a pair of fireplace tongs in her Highlands Ranch apartment.

In legal papers filed Sept. 28, Ybanez’s new defense lawyers claim that his trial attorney was ineffective at defending him, that Ybanez was denied his right to appeal his sentence and that the term should be reduced because Colorado’s sentencing law changed in 2006 allowing juveniles convicted of murder the possibility of parole after 40 years.

Ybanez’s new defense team, Chad Williams and Michael Gallagher, presented evidence at a week-long hearing in February and the legal papers are considered a final argument before Douglas County District Judge Nancy Hopf renders a decision.

The judge could schedule a hearing for oral arguments or she could rely on the legal briefs and issue a ruling.

Abuse claims disputed

Nathan Ybanez, now 27, says repeated abuse by his mother and father, Roger Ybanez, culminated in the murder.

Roger Ybanez denies the abuse allegations. Prosecutors believe Nathan Ybanez committed the crime because his parents threatened to send him to military school as a result of his rebellious behavior.

The new lawyers criticize former defense attorney Craig Truman for not raising the issue of abuse with jurors and say Truman was hired by Roger Ybanez to defend his son, creating a conflict-of-interest in presenting an abuse strategy during the trial.

“He needed an attorney willing and able to investigate and aggressively pursue all defenses . . . ,” the legal briefs say. “He also needed a guardian to consider his best interests, to monitor his attorney-client relationship and to act as a fiduciary on his behalf. He had neither.”

The defense also argues that Truman didn’t present witnesses and social-service documents that would have shown Ybanez was abused.

But Douglas County prosecutors Laura Rosenthal and Jason Siers say Truman did represent his client’s interests and that he asked Ybanez about abuse and the teenager repeatedly denied he was a victim.

Prosecutors say Truman discussed three trial strategies with Ybanez: he was a cold-blooded killer; he was an abused child who snapped; or Jensen instigated the murder.

Initial strategy criticized

Ybanez and Truman chose a second-degree murder defense strategy focusing on Jensen as the planner and Ybanez as a passive follower, prosecutors said.

Truman didn’t call witnesses to testify about the purported abuse because much of it was accusatory toward Roger Ybanez, and not the victim, Julie Ybanez, prosecutors argue.

They also say a doctor hired by Truman to evaluate Nathan Ybanez found the teenager had psychopathic tendencies that could not be cured, and that the defense lawyer did not think the information would help his client.

If a new trial is denied, Ybanez’s lawyers want the judge to re-sentence him to a lesser term and argue that the trial court did not advise him of his right to appeal. Truman did not file an appeal for Ybanez.

Prosecutors concede that the trial court erred in not advising Ybanez that he could appeal his sentence but believe he should just be resentenced to the same term he has now.

Jensen was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole.

Felisa Cardona: 303-954-1219 or [email protected]

Questions surround start of new Supreme Court term

How will Sonia Sotomayor vote? Is John Paul Stevens soon to retire? Will John Roberts and Samuel Alito be more unabashedly conservative? The term begins Monday.

By Warren Richey | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

from the October 4, 2009 edition

(Photograph)
Welcome: Chief Justice John Roberts escorts Justice Sonia Sotomayor after her investiture.

Scott Applewhite / AP

Washington – Transition is the word that perhaps best describes the US Supreme Court’s 2009-10 term set to begin Monday.

The coming year offers an opportunity for court watchers to more clearly define the character of the emerging Roberts Court during Chief Justice John Roberts’s fifth term on the bench. And it presents a chance far superior to the wishy-washy Senate confirmation hearings to finally learn something of the real Sonia Sotomayor, the high court’s newest justice.

Will she be a liberal stalwart or a sometimes ally to the conservatives? If so, in which cases?

The term already includes potential blockbuster cases examining the applicability of Second Amendment gun rights to state and local governments, campaign-finance regulations, life sentences for juveniles, and whether Congress violated the separation of powers when it created an independent accounting oversight board.

The court’s options will reveal more than just legal winners and losers. How these disputes are analyzed and decided by the justices will offer legal scholars important clues about the evolving dynamics within the nation’s highest court.

In addition to the arrival of a new justice, Justice John Paul Stevens’s decision to hire only one law clerk (instead of the usual four) for the 2010-11 term has sparked speculation that he intends to leave the court in June.

Among key trends to watch will be whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito decide to put an unabashedly conservative stamp on the high court by joining their conservative colleagues to boldly overturn liberal legal precedents despite earlier pledges of a preference for judicial minimalism.

The broad internal dynamics at the Supreme Court are well established, with four liberal justices and four conservative justices. In the middle, often wielding a tiebreaking fifth vote, is Justice Anthony Ken­nedy, who leans conservative but sometimes swings to the liberal side in big, high-profile cases.

The arrival of Justice Sotomayor is not expected to significantly change this internal dynamic. Analysts say she should fit comfortably into the liberal wing and is expected to vote in ways similar to David Souter, the justice she replaced.

But she is not Souter. That has some liberals worried and some conservatives hopeful. Early in her legal career, Sotomayor worked as a prosecutor in New York City and later as a federal trial judge. Thus she knows intimately the challenges facing law enforcement officials.

When the high court hears a major case this term on whether police must give precise Miranda warnings before interrogating suspects, court watchers will want to see which Sotomayor votes in the case. Will it be the Latina civil rights activist concerned with defendants’ rights, or the former big-city prosecutor concerned with helping the system fight crime and protect victims?

Thomas Goldstein, a lawyer who has often argued before the Supreme Court, says the departure of Mr. Souter and potential retirement of Justice Stevens could result in the court being nudged to the right. This is because their liberal replacements may not command the same respect that allowed Stevens and Souter to sometimes persuade Justice Kennedy to swing to the left.

“When that relationship is broken and you introduce somebody new into the equation, they can’t possibly be as persuasive,” Mr. Goldstein said in a recent panel discussion at the Cato Institute. “I think the ironic effect of new appointments replacing Justices Stevens and Souter will be to see the court gravitate to the right.”

On Roberts and Justice Alito, analysts are awaiting the court’s decision in a potential landmark campaign-finance case heard during a special argument session Sept. 9.

At issue in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is whether corporations can be barred from spending their treasury money on politically related advertisements during federal election season. The FEC, citing a 2002 campaign-finance law, said yes. Citizens United, a conservative nonprofit advocacy group, said the move amounted to government censorship.

Roberts’s and Alito’s positions in the case are being scrutinized because the justices were confronted with a similar issue in 2006 and refused to join their conservative colleagues in overturning the underlying legal precedents. Now they are being encouraged to take that step again.

Any move to strike down a portion of Congress’s 2002 campaign-finance law and an earlier 1990 Supreme Court precedent will be portrayed by liberal critics as a particularly aggressive assertion of power by the high court’s conservative wing. And it could be a defining moment for the emerging Roberts Court.

But it won’t mean the conservatives will win every big battle at the Supreme Court. With the general 4-to-4 conservative-liberal split on hot-button cases, Kennedy continues to hold the power to decide many of America’s most contentious disputes.

One such case involves two Florida teens who are serving life sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles. At issue in Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida is whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars Florida from keeping the young men imprisoned for the rest of their lives without any possibility for parole. At age 13, Joe Sullivan raped and robbed a 72-year-old woman. Terrance Graham committed a series of armed robberies at ages 16 and 17.

Kennedy will probably be the deciding vote in the case. In 2005, he provided the key vote to declare the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional. The question in the case is whether the same reasoning applies in the circumstances of the two Florida teens.

Free speech is also on the court’s radar this term. At issue in US v. Stevens is whether Congress has the power to ban possession and distribution of images of animal cruelty, such as pit bull fights. A Virginia man was charged under a 1999 federal statute for including footage of a dogfight in Japan (where such fights are legal) in a documentary film he produced and distributed in the US. The central question is whether the First Amendment protects such depictions.

In another Florida case, the justices have agreed to examine a property rights dispute in which owners of seafront property complain that the state used a beach renourishment program to strip them of their legal rights as waterfront property owners.

Under the Flor­ida plan, sand was pumped onto the beach and the state claimed the new dry land for itself. Private waterfront property suddenly became landlocked.

A state appeals court ruled that the owners were due just compensation from the state, but Florida’s Supreme Court upheld the state action.

In US v. Comstock, the court will examine a federal law that allows the government to hold alleged sexual predators indefinitely in protective custody once they are deemed to be “sexually dangerous,” even after they have served a full criminal sentence.

Major Supreme Court cases this term

By ADAM LIPTAK

Published: October 4, 2009

WASHINGTON — In addition to an outsize emphasis on business cases, the new Supreme Court term, starting Monday, will feature an array of other important cases, including ones concerning the First and Second Amendments, Congressional power and criminal law.

Joe Sullivan, 33, is 20 years into a life sentence. He is one of two from Florida asking the Supreme Court to review life sentences without parole that they received as teenagers.

Criminal Law

In a pair of cases from Florida, the court will consider whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment forbids sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In one of the cases, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621, the defendant was convicted of committing a rape at age 13; in the other, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, the defendant was convicted of an armed robbery at age 16.

In 2005, the Supreme Court banned the execution of juvenile offenders on the theory that adolescents are unformed, susceptible to peer pressure and capable of change. The defendants in the new cases say that logic should also apply to sentences of life without parole.

The 2005 decision, Roper v. Simmons, drew on foreign and international law, finding that “the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” Human rights groups say the United States is also alone in sentencing young teenagers to die in prison.

A case concerning the Constitution’s confrontation clause, Briscoe v. Virginia, No. 07-11191, will test the practical implications of a major decision from June. That decision, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, held that prosecutors may not rely on crime lab reports in criminal trials unless they also make the analysts who prepared the reports available to testify.

The Melendez-Diaz decision was decided by a 5-to-4 vote, and it featured some unusual alliances. Three of the court’s more liberal justices, including Justice David H. Souter, joined Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, the two justices committed to applying the original meaning of the Constitution. That coalition, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, said the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that a defendant “be confronted with the witnesses against him” required testimony from the analysts.

The dissenters predicted that the ruling would create a “crushing burden” on the justice system. The new case concerns a challenge to a Virginia law that could limit the impact of Melendez-Diaz. The law allows prosecutors to present crime lab reports without accompanying testimony but gives defendants the right to call the analysts as their own witnesses.

The case will give an early indication of whether Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the court’s newest member and a former prosecutor, will diverge from the approach that her predecessor, Justice Souter, took to criminal cases.

Congressional Power

United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224, concerns the practice of keeping sex offenders in federal prisons locked up after they have completed their sentences on the ground that they remain “sexually dangerous.”

The appeals court in the case ruled that none of the powers granted to Congress in the Constitution authorized it to call for the civil commitment of people said to be “sexually dangerous.” The case does not involve the separate question of whether state prisoners may be held on similar grounds after they have served their sentences.

First Amendment

A cross in the Mojave National Preserve in California that was erected more than 70 years ago as a war memorial is at the center of Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472. After a federal judge ruled that the cross violated the Constitution’s ban on government establishment of religion, Congress transferred the acre of land on which it sits to private ownership, creating what an appeals court called “a little doughnut hole of land with a cross in the midst of a vast federal preserve.”

The Supreme Court case does not directly concern the fundamental question of the constitutional status of the cross. Instead, the justices will consider whether the plaintiff, Frank Buono, had standing to object and whether the transfer arrangement fixed the constitutional problem.

The most important free-speech case of the new term is United States v. Stevens, No. 08-769. It concerns a 1999 federal law that bans commercial trafficking in “depictions of animal cruelty.” The defendant in the case, Robert J. Stevens, was sentenced to 37 months in prison for selling videos of dogfights and of dogs attacking pigs. The court has not identified a category of speech beyond the protection of the First Amendment, since it upheld a law prohibiting the distribution of child pornography in 1982.

Second Amendment

The court on Wednesday agreed to decide a question left open in last year’s big Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v. Heller, which ruled that the amendment protects an individual right that the federal government may not abridge. The question in the new case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521, is whether the amendment also applies to state and local governments.

The Supreme Court returns

Editorial

Published: October 4, 2009

The Supreme Court starts its new session this week with cases on its docket that could reshape the law in campaign finance, gun control and sentencing for juvenile crimes, and with the first new Democratically appointed justice in 15 years. That newest member, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, has been getting a lot of attention, but Justice Anthony Kennedy is likely to continue to wield the real power, on the most controversial issues.

Among the most anticipated cases so far are two that raise the question of whether it is constitutional to sentence juvenile offenders to life without parole. One of the defendants was just 13 when he raped an elderly woman in her home — an appalling and brutal crime, but one that did not involve homicide. We should not be giving up on a person for an act committed at 13. A few years ago, the court ruled that the death penalty for juvenile offenders amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. It should extend that reasoning to these cases.

The court has also agreed to hear the case of a man prosecuted for selling videos of dogfights, in which he was not involved. A federal appeals court ruled that his conviction violated the First Amendment. Animal abuse videos are truly loathsome, but the right approach is to criminalize animal cruelty, as all 50 states do, and not to infringe on free speech.

Following on a major case from last year in which the court struck down parts of the District of Columbia’s gun control law, the justices have decided to consider whether state and local gun control laws can also be challenged under the Second Amendment. The court should not use the case to prevent states and localities from enacting reasonable restrictions on guns.

The court will hear a First Amendment challenge to a cross that stands on land in California that once belonged to the federal government. The government gave the land to a private group to get around a court order that the cross violated the prohibition on state support for religion. The court should rule that despite the land transfer, the cross is unconstitutional.

The docket is heavy with business cases. One asks whether a way of hedging financial risk can be patented. Patents should be limited to more physical creations.

The most important business case, however, is one the court heard last month. In Citizens United v. F.E.C., the court could wipe out a longstanding ban on corporate spending on federal elections, which would allow big business to swamp democracy. We hope the court will avoid such recklessness, and rule narrowly.

The Citizens United argument marked Justice Sotomayor’s debut and she asked several questions that cut to the heart of the matter. A new justice always changes the dynamic of the court, but in ideologically charged cases, Justice Sotomayor’s positions are likely to be similar to those of Justice David Souter, whom she replaced.

That means the court is likely to remain divided between four moderate-liberals and a very conservative bloc of four, with the moderate conservative Justice Kennedy providing the swing vote. Barring any new changes in the Supreme Court’s composition, or any sudden changes of heart among the sitting justices, the law on many issues is likely to be, as it has been for several years now, what Justice Kennedy says it is.

Don’t throw away the key on all juvenile killers

By Scott Harshbarger  |  October 3, 2009

IN MASSACHUSETTS, life without any possibility of parole is the mandatory sentence for a person convicted of murder. But no other state in the nation expressly sets the minimum age of this mandatory sentence as young as Massachusetts does at age 14. Indeed, no other country in the world is known to impose life without parole on children under age 18. Sometimes, being unique can be a point of pride; this is not one of those times.

Of course, the best and cheapest form of protection is prevention. Elsewhere on the continuum is accountability – people must be held accountable for their acts, especially one as egregious and tragic as murder, regardless of whether the murder is committed by a teenager or adult.

But sentencing children to life without parole ignores the realities of youth development: Kids change. Kids grow up. Brain development is responsible for fundamental differences between children and adults.

Does this mean all kids deserve parole? Absolutely not. It means they should have the right to have their case periodically reviewed by a parole board. Life without parole is reserved for the worst of the worst in Massachusetts. It is not appropriate for kids whose personalities are still developing.

When I was attorney general in the 1990s, the state faced a spate of murders committed by teenagers. Many predicted a coming storm of violent juvenile crime. Some warned that without drastic changes to the juvenile justice system, teenagers of the future would be the most violence-prone in history. As it turned out, thankfully, the predictions about teenage “super-predators’’ were wrong.

But the sentencing laws at that time were inadequate, causing understandable anger and fear. Until 1991, the maximum juvenile court sentence for murder was commitment to the Department of Youth Services until the age of 21. This was dangerous, misguided, and a failure to honor the victim’s loss of life.

In 1996, before we all could analyze the impact, Massachusetts lawmakers took the extreme step of removing all murder cases against those 14 and older from juvenile court. Since then, children convicted of first-degree murder have automatically received life without parole.

Nationally, teenage homicide rates peaked in 1994. By 2002, those rates were lower than they were in 1976. In Massachusetts, the peak came in 1992 and, since 1998, the Commonwealth’s teenage homicide rate has never exceeded what it was 30 years ago.

For some youths, serving a life term without parole is an unfortunate necessity. For others, they may become different people – they may grow into adults who have faced the horror of their actions, who search for ways to make positive contributions. Teenage children change. It’s in their nature.

That’s why the Legislature should replace the current law with one that allows for a review of juvenile life sentences. Under the reform recently proposed by juvenile justice advocates, the Parole Board would review juvenile life sentences after 15 years. As Lia Monahon points out in a report released this week by Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts, no one would be released automatically, just given an opportunity to prove their rehabilitation to the board – a tough audience that does not grant second chances lightly.

When a juvenile is sentenced to life without parole, the state spends $2.5 million to keep that person in prison until he dies. That’s too much taxpayer money to ignore the possibility that, over time, it would no longer be necessary. A second look at juvenile life sentences is smart, but also allows us to remain tough, case by case. This way, if we spend $2.5 million, we know why.

In the rest of the world, lawmakers have found ways to protect communities from dangerous youth without relying on life without parole sentences. Massachusetts should do the same.

Scott Harshbarger, a former attorney general of Massachusetts, is senior counsel at Proskauer Rose.

For the youngest killers, a glimmer of redemption

GLOBE EDITORIAL

THE MASSACHUSETTS criminal justice system has lurched between extreme leniency and draconian punishment in cases of children ages 14 to 16 who commit murder. Lawmakers and courts must find a way to protect the public while also offering the possibility of redemption for a child who takes a life. A new report from the Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts shows how to restore the balance.

Before 1996, the harshest punishment for a juvenile murderer who was not transferred to adult court was incarceration until the age of 21. That policy seemed absurdly lenient to legislators at a time when leading sociologists warned of the coming of youthful “superpredators.’’ Those fears would prove overblown. But the law, like the public’s attitude, hardened. Today, a child as young as 14 charged with first-degree murder is automatically tried as an adult and, if convicted, receives a mandatory life sentence without parole.

Wisely, the report calls for treating juveniles convicted of first-degree murder like adults convicted of second-degree murder. That opens the possibility of parole after 15 years or in subsequent reviews. The Legislature should make this change.

Neither a bleeding heart nor a throw-away-the-key solution is the right response to murders by children. Some of the state’s 57 juvenile murderers serving life sentences won’t be rehabilitated as they mature. But some will. Medical experts point out that the adolescent brain differs profoundly from that of an adult, especially in decision-making and assessing risks. States with fair laws recognize the difference between youth and adulthood. They leave some possibility of redemption for young murderers. Massachusetts, however, is an outlier with its insistence on life without parole.

Thomas Grisso, a psychologist at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, says it is difficult to categorize youthful murderers. They range from the impulsive to the cold-blooded. Grisso says he knows juvenile murderers who go on to lead law-abiding and productive lives. While it is difficult for him to predict early on who will desist from violence, it becomes clearer after a period of incarceration. “The system could provide a satisfactory and safe review,’’ he says.

Changing the law to allow such a review wouldn’t give a pass to youthful killers – just a long route home.

Justice Sotomayor, veteran justices face cases on a cross, juveniles

http://thecatholicspirit.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2601&Itemid=33

By Patricia Zapor – Catholic News Service

Friday, 02 October 2009

The Supreme Court opens its 2009 term Oct. 5 with a new justice and cases dealing with at least one religious rights issue — about a cross on a war memorial in a federal preserve — and other cases about the circumstances leading to deportation, about an immigrant in detention being denied medical care and several dealing with the sentencing of convicted criminals.

The court also agreed to take another case about gun rights, following last term’s ruling that overturned a Washington municipal ordinance prohibiting gun ownership.

Still up in the air before the first session of the new term was whether the court would hear an appeal by the Diocese of Bridgeport, Conn., of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s order in May that it release thousands of pages of documents related to settled lawsuits over charges of sexual abuse by priests.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s first day on the court actually came in September, when the justices reheard an election campaign spending law case carried over from the 2008 term. But her first day during a regular session Oct. 5 starts with cases dealing with a water dispute between the states of North Carolina and South Carolina, a question over attorney-client privilege, and interrogation of a criminal suspect.

Sotomayor was confirmed to the court this summer, replacing retired Justice David Souter. The New York native is the sixth Catholic currently sitting on the nine-member court. The child of parents who moved from Puerto Rico, she’s also the first Hispanic and just the third woman justice in the history of the high court.

In the first week of the new term, the court will hear Oct. 7 Salazar v. Buono, which challenges the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision ordering the federal government to no longer permit a cross, erected as a war memorial in 1934, to be displayed on public land.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars put a cross on a rock in an isolated part of the 1.6 million-acre Mojave National Preserve in San Bernardino County, Calif., as a memorial to those killed in World War I. The monument, which has been replaced several times by private organizations or individuals, is quite remote, visible only from a little-used side road.

But a retired National Park Service employee, Frank Buono, challenged the cross’s placement on federal land. Lower courts agreed with his argument that its presence in the reserve gives the inappropriate impression of government endorsement of a religious message. The cross remains on the rock but has been covered since the court ruling.

The case has attracted amicus, or friend of the court, briefs weighing in on one side or the other from dozens of groups representing religious, First Amendment, civil rights and veterans organizations, as well as those representing atheists, military and some police organizations.

An act of Congress in response to Buono’s lawsuit and other challenges provided for the land where the cross stands to be transferred to private ownership in a swap. The lower courts stopped that exchange from taking place, arguing that a “doughnut hole” of private land amid a vast tract of government property would not appear any different to a passer-by, who might conclude it was a federally sanctioned display.

The question of prison sentences for juveniles has also attracted interest from church-related organizations. Joe Harris Sullivan and Terrance Jamar Graham were both sentenced by Florida courts to life imprisonment without parole, for crimes committed when they were 13 and 17, respectively.

In separate cases being heard jointly by the court Nov. 9, Sullivan and Graham challenge their sentences as cruel and unusual punishment. A 2005 Supreme Court ruling struck down the death penalty for juveniles, finding in part that for young people, with more limited judgment than adults, the practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Among the groups advocating for the life sentences to be overruled are former juvenile offenders — including actor Charles Dutton, who first went to juvenile reform school at 13 and to prison for manslaughter at 17 — who argue that they are examples of the value of giving juveniles the chance to turn their lives around.

The American Catholic Correctional Chaplains Association is one of two dozen faith groups and religious leaders that submitted another brief arguing to overturn life sentences for juveniles.

A case being followed by immigrants’ advocates, many of whom are in Catholic and other faith-group-sponsored legal services offices, seeks to hold federal medical workers responsible for the care of a man whose cancer was allowed to advance untreated. Despite his complaints of pain, Francisco Castaneda, a Salvadoran immigrant, went untreated so long when he was in a California prison and then in federal immigration detention that he died at age 36, shortly after his release when a doctor finally diagnosed penile cancer.

The cases, Migliaccio v. Castaneda and Henneford v. Castaneda, also paired by the court, challenge the Federal Tort Claims Act, which bars damages against individuals working for the federal government and otherwise limits claims for negligence against the government. The paired case will be heard after the first of the year.

In the last few years, news reports have uncovered dozens of deaths and many other claims of poor medical care in immigration detention. Late in the Bush administration and again since President Barack Obama took office, changes in procedures and new oversight systems have been announced for how immigrants are treated in detention.

Two other cases deal more directly with immigration. Padilla v. Kentucky raises the question of whether immigrants must be provided with advice about the possible ramifications of criminal cases on their immigration status. It revolves around a Honduran immigrant’s criminal charges for drug-related crimes and his subsequent deportation proceedings.

On the advice of his attorney, Jose Padilla, a legal immigrant and veteran of the U.S. military, pleaded guilty to criminal charges. Although his attorney told him otherwise, the guilty plea triggered deportation proceedings. The court will be asked to consider the obligations of legal counsel in such cases and whether the faulty advice of Padilla’s attorney constitutes grounds for setting aside his guilty plea. The case will be heard Oct. 13.

In Kucana v. Holder, being argued Nov. 10, the court will be asked to evaluate the oversight procedures for government decisions in immigration cases.

Rulings in all the cases are expected before the court adjourns next summer.

What is the age of responsibility? Laws send young people mixed messages

http://www.governing.com/article/what-age-responsibility

From sex to driving to juvenile justice to drinking, state and local laws send young people mixed messages about their own maturity. Is there a better way?
By Alan Greenblatt | October 2009

Justin McNaull grew up in a hurry. By the time he was 23, McNaull had graduated from college, married and gone to work for his local police force in Virginia. But McNaull, now 36, still bristles at the memory of something he wasn’t allowed to do at 23: go down to the airport counter and rent a car. “I’d been involved in police pursuits at more than 100 mph,” he says, “and yet they still wouldn’t rent me a car.”

To many young people, rental-car restrictions are more than an annoyance. They’re also a confusing contradiction, in terms of what society expects of them. After all, states trust people to drive at a much younger age: Most states issue driver’s licenses to persons as young as 16 years old. Yet nearly a decade must pass before the same persons can earn the trust of Hertz or Avis.

By the time adolescents become adults, they are accustomed to such inconsistent treatment. Practically from puberty, young people are bombarded with mixed signals about the scope of their rights and the depth of their responsibilities. And most of those mixed signals come from the laws of state and local governments. In most respects, people are considered adults at 18. That’s when they can vote and enter into legal contracts—including the purchase, if not rental, of a car. But a 20-year-old Marine, just back from patrolling the streets of Baghdad, would have to turn 21 before he could join a local police force in most cities in the United States. A 20-year-old college junior, far more educated than the average American, cannot buy alcohol or enter a casino. In 10 states, a single 20-year-old cannot legally have sex with a 17-year old. But in nearly every state, a 16-year-old can marry—if he has his parents’ permission. (A handful of states allow girls to marry before boys.)

The most glaring examples lie within the criminal justice system. A spike in juvenile violence two decades ago spurred state legislators to adopt the mantra “adult time for adult crimes.” Consequently, in most states, a 10-year-old charged with murder can be tried as an adult. Slightly older teens can be tried in adult courts for virtually every other crime. Even when states wait until 18 to treat criminals as adults, they don’t like to wait long. Until recently, inmates at youth detention facilities in New Mexico were woken up just one minute after midnight on their 18th birthdays, in order to be moved to adult prisons.

Recently, many of these lines drawn between adolescence and maturity have been called into question. For example, the presidents of 135 universities are campaigning to consider lowering the drinking age from 21. They note that binge drinking on campus is rampant despite the stricture, and argue that if students were given the right to drink at an earlier age, they might handle it more responsibly. Another argument is a reprise of the one that came up 40 years ago when servicemen came home from Vietnam. Then, the complaint was that soldiers were old enough to die but not to vote. (The 26th Amendment took care of that problem by lowering the voting age to 18.) Today, military personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are left to question why they can fight America’s wars but still can’t patronize its bars.

Meanwhile, legislatures and courts are hearing a very different argument from a group of people that haven’t traditionally testified before them: neuroscientists. Using advanced brain-scanning technology, scientists are getting a better view of how the human brain develops than ever before. And what they’ve found is that in most people, the prefrontal cortex and its links to other regions of the brain are not fully formed until age 25—much later than anyone had realized. These areas are the seat of “executive decision making”—the parts of the brain that allow people to think through the likely consequences of an action, weigh the risks and benefits and stop themselves from acting on impulse. In other words, the stuff that makes you a mature person.

To state and local lawmakers and judges, the brain research can come as a revelation: Maybe the car-rental companies were right all along. What to do about this is another matter. In America, “adulthood” already has its familiar compass points, 18 and 21. But what is the age of responsibility? And what if that age—the point when citizens are responsible enough to earn all of the rights a democracy confers upon its people—bears no resemblance to the ages already enshrined in law? Finding the answers to those questions is a more complicated task than simply choosing a milestone birthday. “There’s been a growing recognition that most of our earlier law in how we treat adolescents and young adults was chaotic and not tied to any empirical rationale,” says Brian Wilcox, a psychologist at the University of Nebraska. “When many of these laws were established, there really wasn’t research on which they could be based.”

The age at which children are considered mature is rooted in a mix of culture, convenience and historical precedent. Aristotle wrote of 21 as the age when a person would have completed three 7-year stages of youth development. During the Middle Ages, legend has it that 21 was considered the age of adulthood because that’s when men were capable of wearing a full suit of armor. Arbitrary as such reasoning may sound to modern Americans, 21 stuck as a threshold age through the 19th century and into the 20th. Until they turned 21, young people owed their parents either their labor or their wages, whether that meant working on the family farm or operating a machine in an urban factory and handing over their pay.

But during the Progressive Era, reform efforts and adolescent research began to change notions about growing up. States, and eventually the federal government, enacted child-labor laws, keeping kids from working and ultimately making their attendance in high school compulsory. Such laws were opposed by business groups, which hated to let go of the cheap labor, and supported by unions, which didn’t like the cheaper competition.

Through the middle of the 20th century, the onset of adulthood seemed to come earlier and earlier. War was partly responsible for that, as 18-year-olds went off to fight in World War II, followed by the wars in Korea and Vietnam. On the home front, manufacturing jobs didn’t require a high-school diploma. It was thus common for 18-year-olds to support themselves and start their own families. And the rise of youth culture in the 1950s and 60s turned the teen years into their own distinctive stage of development—and consumer spending. There was a new sense that reaching the end of this life phase was a rite of passage in and of itself.

Nowadays, teens face more cultural pressure than ever to grow up fast, in certain ways. Recent controversies over whether 16-year-old pop star Miley Cyrus has sexualized her image is the latest symptom of that. Yet there’s a strong pull in exactly the opposite direction, too. Many more 18-year-olds are choosing college over work now than a generation or two ago. They live independently at school for part of the year but under their parents’ roofs for the rest. People are getting married later than they used to, and many have become slower about starting their own careers. Even before the current recession, plenty of college grads and dropouts had “boomeranged” back to Mom and Dad’s house. Sociologists now talk of “extended adolescence” and “delayed adulthood.”

That means that the window of time during which teens and young adults “grow up” is opening wider. This partly explains why state and local governments are so haphazard when it comes to young people: The law, and the people who write and interpret it, are just as befuddled about how to handle this situation as any anxious parent. Mostly, they have responded by cracking down. On an annual basis, the number of laws regulating the behavior of people under 18 has more than tripled since the 1950s. Curfews are now common. Recently, states have banned minors from purchasing items such as nitrous-oxide inhalants and fruit-flavored mini-cigars. Various jurisdictions have restricted “sexting”—sending lewd photos via cell phones. And 20 states ban only those under 18 from talking on cell phones while driving, despite evidence that the behavior (even using a hands-free device) is treacherous among drivers of all ages.

So there is a bit of hypocrisy, too, in the way governments define the age of responsibility. While nearly every state recently has put new limits on teen drivers, no state has begun restricting—or even testing—elderly drivers, some of whom may, like teens, lack mastery of their vehicles. Franklin Zimring, a UC Berkeley law professor, suggests that it’s easier to block youngsters from obtaining rights than it is to take away rights to which adults have grown accustomed. That’s because states aren’t really denying young people rights, Zimring says. They’re asking them to wait.

As Jack McCardell sees it, the wait can be counterproductive. McCardell is the former president of Middlebury College in Vermont. He’s also the leader of the group of college presidents calling for a national debate about the drinking age. Technically, states hold the power to set their own drinking ages. But since the mid-1980s, Congress has all but required the age to be set at 21. If states were to set it any lower, they would forfeit 10 percent of their federal highway funds.

McCardell points to surveys showing that upwards of 90 percent of young people have had drinks or gotten drunk before turning 21. Those numbers only confirm what everyone knows—that binge drinking is out of control on college campuses. Of the current drinking age, McCardell says, “it’s pretty hard to argue on the most basic terms that it’s been at all successful, given the number who continue to consume.”

McCardell believes that the current laws not only are ineffective and unenforceable but are in fact leading students to drink more heavily in illicit and unsafe circumstances. The problem, he says, is that underage kids don’t actually consider themselves underage. McCardell believes this is a direct consequence of the mixed messages states send teenagers about responsibility. “We have a law that is out of step with social and cultural reality,” he says. “In the eyes of a culture and a polity that understands in the most general way that 18 is the age of adulthood, the most glaring exception is the prohibition on alcohol, and that is why we’ve had such a difficult time enforcing this law.”

A half-dozen states have taken McCardell up on the challenge of at least debating the idea of lowering the drinking age. But McCardell is the first to admit that none of them will ever pass legislation as long as a big chunk of their highway dollars is at risk. In fact, if there’s any trend among states, it’s to crack down further on drinking by those under age 21. States have created new keg-registration requirements, stepped up enforcement of carding at convenience stores and passed “social host” laws that impose liability on adults who serve alcohol to teens at parties.

Some supporters of holding the drinking age steady acknowledge that 21, when it comes right down to it, is an arbitrary age. Twenty-five might be better, if unrealistic. But they argue that enforcement is a problem at any age, and lowering the legal limit to 18 would only mean pushing the drinking problem further down to 16- and 17-year-olds. Alexander Wagenaar, a health policy professor at the University of Florida, goes further. He believes that lowering the drinking age would be disastrous. After states set the age at 21, he says, teen highway deaths immediately dropped by 15 to 20 percent. “The people who are advocating going down to 18,” says Wagenaar, “should acknowledge that they’re willing to risk an extra thousand deaths per year and double that number of injuries.”

The debate about drinking hinges on the question of whether the age of responsibility has been set too high. But in the juvenile justice world, a parallel debate has been going on about whether the age of responsibility has been set too low.

In the early 20th century, every state created stand-alone legal systems for handling juveniles, defined as those under 18. Advocates of that era described the states as “a sheltering wise parent” that would shield a child from the rigors of criminal law. By the 1980s, however, the idea that rehabilitating such offenders should be the main goal of the system had lost credibility. Due to a spike in juvenile homicides involving handguns—and concerns that young “superpredators” presented an extreme and growing danger to society—legislators passed countless laws that made it easier to try minors as adults. This was true not only for serious matters such as murder and drug crimes but also for minor infractions and misdemeanors. Some plea bargains are available to teens only if they agree to adult handling. Specific numbers are hard to come by, but on any given day, an estimated 10,000 minors are housed in adult facilities.

Now, states are just starting to rethink the wisdom of sending 13-year-olds to spend hard time among older, more experienced criminals. According to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, youths who had previously been tried as adults are 34 percent more likely to commit a crime again than those who went through the juvenile justice system. Not only do young offenders treated as adults reoffend sooner and more frequently, they’re also more likely to go on to commit violent crimes.

On this matter, states are finding, nothing is more persuasive than crime data. Despite all the media attention given years ago to superpredators, the vast majority of youth crimes involve property theft and drugs and seldom involve murder. And while there are still roughly 250,000 juveniles tried each year, the rate of crime for this cohort, as measured by arrests, has gone down in each of the past 15 years.

Tough policies toward juveniles remain prevalent, but a few states have begun loosening up. In 2005, Illinois ended its policy of automatically transferring juvenile misdemeanor cases to adult courts, leaving the decision up to judges. A follow-up study found a dramatic drop in the number of cases referred to adult court, suggesting that most of the old automatic transfers had not involved serious crimes.

As of January 1, Connecticut will end its policy of treating all offenders 16 and up as adults. A similar proposal in North Carolina stalled this summer. While the latest research and crime statistics have opened up room for a fresh debate about juvenile justice, that space could evaporate at any time. There’s no telling when a high-profile teen crime may catch the attention of cable news. “If we have another crime wave for whatever reason,” says Shay Bilchik, of the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, “it will be very difficult to resist going back to lock ’em up.”

It’s precisely because policy toward teens can be so random and emotionally charged that some people find the discoveries about brain development reassuring. The brain scans are putting hard science behind what anyone who has raised an adolescent knows—that young people simply aren’t always capable of making good decisions.

Increasingly, this scientific evidence is being introduced in regard to juvenile justice. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the juvenile death penalty after receiving stacks of briefs summarizing the latest adolescent brain research. The justices will surely get an update on the science this fall when they hear a pair of cases from Florida meant to determine whether sentencing juveniles to life without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Scientists now regularly appear before legislative committees, showing pictures that make clear the developmental differences between a 16-year-old brain and that of a 25-year-old. The scans show, in the words of Temple University psychologist Laurence Steinberg, that juveniles may be “less guilty by reason of adolescence.”

But while brain research is “sexy,” Steinberg says, it hasn’t necessarily persuaded legislators that they need to change laws regarding crime and punishment. Nor has it fundamentally changed the way policy makers view the age of responsibility in terms of when young people can drink, smoke or drive. The conclusion that 25 might be the most scientifically defensible age for any of those things is simply a nonstarter politically. Texas state Representative Jerry Madden says he’s sympathetic to the argument that “the brain isn’t fully developed until 25, and that’s when people should be allowed to do certain things.” But he says he suggested to a brain scientist who once made that case to him that “she could carry that bill—I wasn’t going to.”

Even scientists are cautious about leaning too hard on the neurobiology. Research linking brain structure to actual human behavior is still limited. And neuroscientists are clear about the fact that different parts of the brain mature along different timetables. In other words, executive thinking may not reach its peak until 25 but most people are capable of performing many adult functions adequately at an earlier age—probably between 16 and 21. “We’re very early in the curve of finding out how the brain research should be interpreted,” says Ronald Dahl, a professor of pediatrics and psychiatry at the University of Pittsburgh.

The fact that every person is different and develops at his own pace doesn’t make the creation of policy any easier. Parents can guide their children, let them learn from their mistakes when they need to and bail them out when they have to. But laws are less sympathetic. Laws must draw lines, in order to be fair and comprehensible. And there will never be enough brain scans to go around to draw those lines as accurately as we might like.

What those laws can do, however, is acknowledge that growing up is a process, not a birthday. And in at least one major policy area—the driving age—states are finding ways to recognize this by introducing youngsters to increasing levels of responsibility, rather than foisting it upon them all at once.

The driving age is more rooted in practical experience than the arbitrary conventions that define the drinking age and most other adult responsibilities. Early in the 20th century, there essentially was no regulation. As soon as someone’s feet could reach the pedals, he or she was free to drive. Driving tests didn’t come into widespread practice until the 1940s. And until recently, many states, particularly in agricultural areas, gave licenses to kids who passed the test when they turned 14. South Dakota will still grant a driver’s license to a person as young as 14 years, 3 months. On the other end of the spectrum, New Jersey is the only state that makes teenagers wait as late as their 17th birthdays.

Of the rights and rites of adulthood, driving holds a special place. On one hand, in a country with meager access to public transit, being able to operate a car is tantamount to mobility. Learning to drive is as essential to taking a first job as it is to going out on a first date—or at least doing those things without being chauffeured around by parents. On the other hand, driving is by far the most likely way that a young person will kill himself or others. According to the CDC, 4,500 Americans between 16 and 19 die from motor vehicle crashes annually, while another 400,000 are injured seriously enough to require emergency treatment. Obviously, driving is a responsibility that must be given to young people with great care.

The new approach that has taken hold among the states is called “graduated driver licensing,” or GDL. The idea is to license kids to start driving at a certain age, but on a probationary basis. They might have to put in more hours driving with their parents or with professional instructors. They might not be allowed to drive at night. Or they might not be permitted to drive in the company of friends—peer pressure is often a factor when young drivers make bad decisions behind the wheel. GDLs have been implemented in some form in every state except North Dakota.

One reason why GDLs have become popular with state lawmakers is because they represent the middle ground in a highly emotional debate. Following a horrific car crash in his district, Illinois state Representative John D’Amico introduced legislation to raise the driving age in his state from 16 to 18. But D’Amico, who is from Chicago, quickly found out that the rural roots of early driving run deep. “I couldn’t get Southern Illinois to agree to it,” he says. Instead, D’Amico proposed a GDL. The law that passed in 2007 tightened nighttime driving curfews for 16- and 17-year-olds and required new drivers to wait a full year before they can carry more than one non-relative.

The impact was immediate. In 2007 in Illinois, 155 teens between the ages of 16 and 19 died in automobile crashes. In 2008, that number fell to 92. Those results track with findings on GDLs nationally. According to a Johns Hopkins University study, states with strong GDL laws have cut accidents among young drivers by 40 percent, with injuries down 38 percent.

Would the roads be even safer if the driving age were 25? Probably. But the GDL approach at least recognizes that young drivers are at their most dangerous in their first six months on the road. GDLs give adolescents time to practice, with less risk to themselves and other drivers. Their brains may not always make the best judgments about how fast to drive at night or in the rain. But that’s somewhat compensated for by the experience they’re getting behind the wheel. “The science says that what you want to do with kids is what parents and grandparents know,” says Dahl. “If you give them freedom and they can handle it, then they get a little bit more.”

That’s what Justin McNaull thinks, too. Having complained about not being able to rent a car as a 23-year-old cop, McNaull now works for AAA, where he lobbies for restrictions on young drivers. The key, he says, is finding the right balance between safety and responsibility. “We could maximize safety by raising the driving age to 25, but that’s not practical,” he says. “We know we’re not going to push the driving age anywhere near 25 and none of us is trying to.”

Could a GDL-type approach work in other policy areas? McCardell, the former university president, believes it could. He favors subjecting young people to testing to receive drinking permits that could be revoked if they in some way abuse the privilege. The idea needs some work: How, exactly, would states go about designing a drinking test? But he has a point. A right such as drinking could be made more contingent on one’s ability to handle it responsibly and less a function of merely reaching a milestone age.

Robert Epstein, a psychologist and author of Teen 2.0, says states could learn something from the way they regulate pharmacists and masseurs. Just as those groups are licensed based on the competence requirements of their professions, adolescents could accrue rights based on somehow proving they’re up to the task. Teens would do pretty well under such a system, he argues. He’s just completed a study of more than 30,000 people showing that 30 percent of American teens are more competent than the median adult in a variety of areas. “If we’re trying to decide what rights and privileges to extend,” Epstein says, “we have to look at individual competence.”

Which brings us back to the problem of there not being enough brain scans to go around. States are never going to spend the time and money needed to test individuals on their ability to drink or understand legal contracts. Should government really decide when an individual is ready to have sex? And there’s certainly a long and sordid history that argues against the idea of testing people on their competence to vote. Franklin Zimring, the UC Berkeley law professor, suggests that the GDL approach may be uniquely suited to the particular skills and risks of driving.

It would be useful, however, for states to think more broadly when it comes to the age of responsibility. States have been acting in ever-more-punitive ways toward teens. Yet the point of laws regulating the behavior of young people should not be to restrict them. It’s to begin educating them in the ways of responsible adulthood. What’s important, after all, is not passing a test or meeting an arbitrary age requirement, but learning lessons and applying them to real life.

Juvenile life without parole sentence too harsh report says

Advocates seek Mass. law change

By Jonathan Saltzman, Globe Staff  |  September 30, 2009

Despite its liberal reputation, Massachusetts has one of the harshest laws in the country for sentencing murderers as young as 14 to life in prison without parole, and many of the 57 people serving such mandatory sentences are first-time offenders, according to an advocacy group that wants them to become eligible for parole.

The Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts, in what it said was the first comprehensive study of the 1996 law that resulted in such sentences for first-degree murder, found that a disproportionate percentage of the children locked up for the rest of their lives are black. Many of the offenders were convicted with adult codefendants, some of whom got milder sentences and have been freed.

The report, which is scheduled to be released today, followed a two-year review of most of the cases in which children ages 14, 15, and 16 were tried in adult court and sentenced to life. The study says that penalties for juvenile murderers were inadequate in the 1980s but that the Legislature went too far when it passed the current law in response to what the center describes as overblown fears of young super predators.

The group wants Governor Deval Patrick and the Legislature to change the law to at least make juveniles convicted of first-degree murder eligible for parole after 15 years, as is true for people convicted of second-degree murder.

“Life-without-parole sentences may be an appropriate response to some adult crimes, especially in a state like Massachusetts that does not impose the death penalty,’’ the 33-page report said. “But the current law treats youths as young as 14 exactly like adults, regardless of their age, past conduct, level of participation in the crime, personal background, and potential for rehabilitation.’’

Geline W. Williams, executive director of the Massachusetts District Attorneys Association, said yesterday she could not comment on the report until she reads it. But, “There’s no question that there are some juveniles who commit absolutely horrific crimes and have absolutely horrific records before they commit the ultimate crime of murder,’’ she said.

The two state lawmakers who chair the joint Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Eugene L. O’Flaherty and Senator Cynthia Stone Creem, said they were willing to reexamine the 1996 law.

O’Flaherty said a few notorious crimes can often result in “legislative overreaction, and usually it takes a few years to see the unforeseen consequences of getting too tough, too quickly, and not being smart about getting tough.’’

Massachusetts is one of at least 39 states with youths serving sentences of life without parole; about 2,500 inmates around the country serve such sentences. But only Massachusetts and Connecticut give adult courts exclusive jurisdiction over murder cases against children as young as 14 and then impose a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for all first-degree murder convictions, regardless of the circumstances, the report said.

Several states are considering changing their laws to give youth offenders an opportunity to earn parole, in part because scientific research into the difference between the adolescent and adult brain shows that teenagers often cannot appreciate the consequences of their actions.

Last year, after citing similar neuroscientific evidence, Human Rights Watch called sentences of life without parole for juveniles “cruel, unfair, and unnecessary.’’

Massachusetts enacted the current law, partly in response to insufficient juvenile court sentences in the 1980s, when the harshest punishment for a juvenile who was not transferred to an adult court – even for murder – was incarceration until 21.

In the 1990s, a number of widely publicized juvenile murder cases prompted the Legislature to mandate that all juveniles charged with first- or second-degree murder be tried in adult court and that conviction for first-degree murder result in an automatic sentence of life without parole.

One of those cases involved Edward S. O’Brien, the 15-year-old who stabbed his best friend’s mother 98 times across the street from his Somerville home in 1995. After two years of hearings and intervention by the state’s highest court, O’Brien was tried as an adult and sentenced to life without parole.

The Children’s Law Center contends that crime rates do not justify such harsh sentences. Homicide rates for Massachusetts youth under 18 peaked in 1992.

Since 1998, the homicide rate among adolescents has been lower than it was 30 years ago.

The center, which reviewed in detail 46 of the 57 juvenile murderers serving life sentences without parole, said 41 percent had no prior record. Forty percent of the offenders had been convicted along with adult defendants, but many of the adults got lighter sentences.

“Frequently, the adults who are actually the primary actors [in the murders] and are in possession of the knowledge that matters are in a better position to offer information in exchange for better treatment from prosecutors,’’ said Lia Monahon, the lawyer for the center who wrote the report.

Blacks make up 47 percent of the juveniles sentenced to life without parole but account for less than 7 percent of children under 18 in Massachusetts, said the report. Monahon said the disparity could reflect bias in the criminal justice system.

Jonathan Saltzman can be reached at [email protected]